



OREGON COMMISSION ON BLACK AFFAIRS

2012 REPORT TO LEGISLATORS

**SERVING THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN OREGON
SINCE 1983**

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Oregon

John A. Kitzhaber, Governor

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February 15, 2013

To the Governor, Honorable Members of the Oregon Legislative Assembly:

On behalf of the Oregon Commission on Black Affairs, I am proud to submit this report. The report will serve as both a summary of the work accomplished by the Commission during the last biennium as well as an introduction to our goals for the 2013-2015 one.

The past biennium had challenges for the OCBA but throughout the Commission remained focused on issues of equitable treatment for African Americans statewide in our strategic priority areas of education, economics, health care and justice.

The Commission also worked more closely with its sister Advocacy Commissions on joint advocacy, internship and community outreach which included a joint presentation to the City Club of Portland outlining our work together. Nowhere was this partnership more evident than in our work with Oregon Commission on Hispanic Affairs (OCHA) on a law internship researching hate crime protections in the state, how they are prosecuted for both criminal and civil remedies and free speech protections. We expect that research will impact one or more bills on hate crimes during the 2013 legislative session.

The Commissioners also extended their outreach to the community. The Commission has ongoing meetings with OCBA Community Partners such as the Urban League of Portland, and also members of the African-American Ecumenical community, and Portland African American Leadership Forum (PAALF.) Commissioners serve on a wide array of other Boards and Commissions where they help the OCBA broaden the input we receive on key issues.

The goals of the OCBA during the next biennium remain consistent. Those goals are to be a well-reasoned voice for the state's African-American community, to bring the community and lawmakers together on issues of concern to our community, grow leadership within government, research and recommend public policy with joint internships and to facilitate dialog and action among people looking to solve issues that face our community.

OR Commission on Black Affairs

Chair:

Isaac E. Dixon, PhD

Vice Chair:

James Morris

Commissioners:

Karol Collymore
James I. Manning, Jr.
Lorraine Wilson

Legislative Liaisons:

Sen. Rod Monroe
Rep. Lew Frederick

Staff:

Lucy Baker, Administrator
Nancy Kramer, Executive
Asst.

The 2013 legislative session will be one full of difficult choices and opportunities for legislators working to make a difference for communities of color and women within Oregon, and the OCBA will be there as a resource. The Commission is dedicated to facilitating partnerships that can yield progress for all African-American citizens in Oregon.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Isaac Dixon', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Isaac Dixon
Chair

A Brief Overview of the Commission

Oregon's Commission on Black Affairs was created to be a link between Oregon's African Americans, Blacks, and Oregon government. In 1980, Former Governor Vic Atiyeh created the commission. Three years later, the Oregon Legislative Assembly's vote made it a statutory commission. The goal was to improve communication between the state legislature, The Governor, and Oregon's African Americans and Blacks, to involve more African American and Blacks in policy making and program planning.

Mission & Duties

Mission

The Commission on Black Affairs was established in 1983 to work for the implementation and establishment of economic, social, legal and political equality for blacks in Oregon, make recommendations to the Governor, report biennially to the Legislature, monitor programs and legislation, research problem areas, maintain a liaison between the black community and government, and grow leadership on state boards and commissions.

Duties

The Commission's responsibilities are many. It is authorized by law to:

- Monitor existing programs and legislation designed to meet the needs of African Americans and Blacks;
- Identify and research concerns and issues affecting the African American and Black community, and to recommend actions to the governor and to the Legislative Assembly, including recommendations on legislative programs;
- Act as a liaison between the African American, Black community and Oregon's government;
- Encourage African American and Black representation on state Boards and Commissions;
- Employ an Executive Director and other staff as necessary to carry out its responsibilities;
- Establish special committees as needed.

The Status of Oregon's African American Community

In 2012, the status of Oregon's African American community is a story of great progress as well as obstacles yet to be overcome. There was progress in the election of an African American woman to the Multnomah County Board of Commissioners. African American legislators were re-elected to the state Senate and House of Representatives.

Yet, obstacles remain in our state. Gentrification has greatly impacted the Portland metropolitan area diffusing the state's largest African American population. As a result, many potential black voters now live in East Multnomah County or Washington County. This population shift will have future ramifications for the cultivation of African American political candidates and for the voting power of African Americans in Oregon.

In the area of economics, the state of African American unemployment in Oregon mirrors national statistics. The annual statewide unemployment rate for White Oregonians was 9.1% in January 2013, while unemployment among African Americans was 21.3%. Economic numbers such as these will be a main focus of the commission during the 2013-15 biennium. Growing diversity in recruitment and retention efforts within business and government, in concert with our colleagues on the state's other Advocacy Commissions and community partners, will focus on creating family wage work for people of color all across Oregon.

The Commission will also be mindful that opportunities for economic advancement begin with a good education. In 2012, the Governor announced an ambitious plan to revamp how education works in Oregon. The Oregon Commission on Black Affairs took part in policy discussions with education leaders in communities throughout Oregon. One issue that surfaced which the commission will be looking into further during 2013-15 is the disparity in student discipline in schools. Data suggests that African American students are disciplined more often and more severely than their counterparts. There is also evidence that discipline can lead to children dropping out of school at higher rates than children who are not disciplined. There is also ample data which suggests that children who drop out of school are more likely to have encounters with the criminal justice system. This is a future that African American parents, educators and activists will not stand idly by and watch happen. Working with educators and legislators the Commission will seek to reverse this trend.

In 2011-12 the Commission worked with legislators to introduce a Hate Crimes Bill. After watching how the bill is being interpreted and administered by jurisdictions around the state, the commission will be working with legislative partners to re-introduce the bill and improve it. The commission also worked much more closely with its sister commissions during the last biennium. This closer collaboration has permitted the commission to expand its reach even with decreasing resources.

COMMISSIONERS



Chair Isaac Dixon, PhD, Portland

Isaac E. Dixon, PhD., SPHR, currently serves as the Associate Vice President and Director of Human Resources at Lewis and Clark College located in Portland. He has enjoyed a long career in HR having worked with Providence Health and Services, Unitus Community Credit Union, Nike and many government agencies and has been awarded the Northwest Human Resources Management Association's Distinguished Member Award on two different occasions. Dr. Dixon is most proud of his history of community service on the Board of Directors of the Oregon State Bar Association, the Urban League of Portland, and on the boards of a wide variety of other community based agencies.

Isaac is an adjunct faculty member at the University of Phoenix, Portland State University and Portland Community College. He resides in Portland with his wife Lauri.



Vice Chair James Morris, Portland

James is a South Carolina native though, after living in Portland for 15 years he considers himself an Oregonian, born into a family of life-long educators. His parents have engrained the importance of achieving an education in him since early childhood. He is an Air Force veteran and attended a small liberal arts college in SC by the name of Lander University.

James believes in the importance of everyone having the opportunity to have a voice in the political process. He also believes that the best way to make that happen is for people of conscience, from varied cultural backgrounds, to come together, break down barriers and work collaboratively towards common goals.



Karol Collymore, Portland

Karol Collymore has spent her career in public service. She started in politics at 21 in New Mexico, working first for Gore/Lieberman 2000 and hasn't looked back. She is a community activist, volunteering with many non-profit around Portland and conducted a year-long experiment hosting progressive dinner parties for small non-profits like Schoolhouse Supplies and P:ear. For fun she enters cooking contests and writes bad dating tales to share with strangers and friends alike.



James I. Manning, Jr., Eugene

Commissioner Manning is a native of St Louis, Missouri. In 2007 he honorably retired after twenty-four years active duty service from the United States Army. Upon his retirement from the Army he and wife Lawanda relocated to Eugene where he gives to that community serving on an array of appointed and volunteer positions. A few of James' noteworthy community services is his appointment to the Eugene City Police Commission and the City's task-force on homelessness. He continues as a Board of Director for Pearl Buck Center and volunteers for Lane County Circuit Court Small Claims Department as a Mediator. On May 15, 2012 James campaigned for and was elected to the Eugene Water and Electric Board as a Commissioner. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Criminal Justice Administration from

Columbia College of Missouri and a Master of Arts Degree in Organizational Leadership from Chapman University, Orange California.



Lorraine Wilson, Eugene-Hermiston

Lorraine Wilson came to Oregon in 2000 from the twin island state of Trinidad and Tobago. She is an immigrant and citizen of the United States of America and is raising a responsible black male. She currently holds a BS in Business Management and is a lifelong learner. She has spent most of her life working with upper management in the private sector and higher education. Lorraine comes from a family of educators. Her father Lloyd Gervais is a retired school principal and deceased sister was a dedicated teacher. Her passion is about changing the future for black Americans by impacting the educational system. African American children are being given the message around third grade that they are not good enough. The achievement gap for black students continues to grow. Coming from a majority black country Lorraine is aware that there are brilliant children as well as those who need more creative ways to succeed, but race should not be a factor. Therefore, she is committed to ensuring that Black students are once again empowered to be successful.

OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REPRESENTATIVES



Senator Rod Monroe, D- Clackamas and Multnomah County, District 24

Rod Monroe has been a life-long educator. He taught high school and college and has served on the David Douglas School Board and currently is on the Mt Hood Community College Board. Rod has been elected to public office 14 times. He has served in the Oregon Legislature for 15 years and previously served on the Metro Council for 12 years. Rod is an active runner and outdoorsman. He currently serves as State Senator from District 24 (East Portland and Happy Valley).



Representative Lew Frederick, D- Portland, District 43

Oregon State Representative Lew Frederick took office on October 30, 2009 during a swearing-in ceremony in the House Chambers of the Oregon Capitol Building. Professionally he is a Strategic Communications Consultant, focusing on Strategic Planning, Community Relations, Science/Technical issues and Media Crisis Communications. With an academic background in biology, theater, and political science, his professional life includes seventeen years as a television reporter at KGW-Channel 8 in Portland, thirteen years as the Director of Public Information for the Portland Public Schools, teacher, actor and ranch-hand. [[see full bio](#)]

STAFF

Lucy Baker, Administrator

Lucy Baker joined the OACO as its Administrator in 2010. She has served as the Executive Director of the Oregon Business Leadership Network, a Portland based non-profit and named partner in the Oregon Business Plan in 2007 focused on growing cultures of inclusion within business. Lucy also has served as the Interim Director of the Planning and Special Projects Unit and Sr. Policy Analyst for Multnomah County Aging and Disability Services. Her career and passion has focused on building networks and partnerships that grow equity for underrepresented populations.



Nancy Kramer, Executive Assistant

Nancy Kramer,, has a history of working in the nonprofit field, in Portland and also in her hometown of New York City. She loves supporting all four Oregon Advocacy Commissions in the important work they do for their communities. Prior to working for the Commissions she has been a Stage Manager, Production Manager, Operations Manager and Event Coordinator.



COMMISSION HIGHLIGHTS

Public Policy Internship on Hate Crime Protection

In 2012, the OCBA with the OCHA hosted their first Public Policy Internship for a law student on researching hate crime statutes, reporting and training in Oregon. The internship was co-sponsored with the DOJ Office of Civil Rights and the Governors Offices of Diversity and Inclusion and Safety.

The report of the internship, *Oregon Hate Crime Laws, Internship Findings and Final Report*, is included as an appendix to this report and provides a review and analysis of the statutory language to identify and proposed areas for improvement. The research conducted a review of civil and criminal remedies, the relationship between hate speech and hate crime, and description of loopholes in existing statutes that have resulted from court decisions. Statistical analysis of reports under the Hate Crime Statistics Act was undertaken and the reporting process and police training was researched and problems identified.

Senator Shields and Rep. Frederick who serve on the OCHA and OCBA served as advisors for the intern to consider the policy implications of the data and research for legislative or administrative responses.

"I strongly support partnering with the Oregon Advocacy Commissions as well as other government, educational and civic organizations in support of public policy internships. These partnerships leverage collective knowledge and expertise in civil rights and serve to help ensure equality for all Oregonians." Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum

"As a law student, the internship on hate crimes was important to me because it helps my goal of creating positive change in society with visible results." – Wesley Garcia, Willamette University College of Law student, Intern for OCHA and OCBA

OCBA Annual Joint Legislative Days with Urban League of Portland

Each year the Oregon Commission on Black Affairs partners with Urban League of Portland and other community groups state wide to host a day at the Capitol during session. For the 2012 and 2013 sessions, over 500 individuals attended the Our Voices United days at the Capitol. It is a time to meet with legislators on priority issues, and rally at the Capitol to hear presentations on topics including access to health care, culturally competent care, tuition equity, hate crime protections, and other issues.

In 2013 the Commission has been active in assuring that hate crime legislation addressing both criminal and civil remedies receive hearings. It has testified in the 2013 session on culturally competent care:

Joint Advocacy Commission Testimony in support of HB 2611

Friday, February 15, 2013

House Committee on Health Care

Chair Greenlick, Vice Chairs Keny-Guyer and Thompson, and Representatives Clem, Conger, Harker, Kennemer, Lively, and Weidner:

The Chairs of the Oregon Advocacy Commissions are submitting testimony in support of HB 2611 on culturally competent care on behalf of the Oregon Advocacy Commissions including:

- The Commission on Asian & Pacific Islander Affairs, Stephen Ying, Chair*
- The Commission on Black Affairs, Isaac Dixon, Chair*
- The Commission on Hispanic Affairs, Andrea Cano, Chair*
- The Commission for Women, Stephanie Vardavas, Chair*

Addressing disparities in access to effective health care for communities of color and women is a strategic priority of the Oregon Advocacy Commissions. This includes the overrepresentation of communities of color and women in health issues including diabetes, heart disease, and high blood pressure, and the underrepresentation of these communities in health screening, pre-natal care and other areas.

We believe that requiring documentation of education in providing culturally competent care for physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals is essential in assuring that in the moment that care is being provided, that it is delivered in effective and engaging ways for all Oregonians. Requiring training on delivery of culturally competent care for the providers is a key strategy in supporting professional excellence while improving outcomes for cultural and ethnic communities and women who face significant challenges to health care access and effectiveness. The OHA's work and expertise with these communities and health care professionals assures that as cultural competency is defined and training is identified, it will be reflective of the best thinking and practice statewide and nationally for delivery of such care.

The Oregon Advocacy Commissions urge the Committee members to positively consider this groundbreaking legislation and support it with your vote.

In 2013 the Oregon Advocacy Commissions are partnering with APANO (Asian Pacific American Network of Oregon), the Urban League of Portland, Oregon Latino Health Coalition, and AAUW to send a clear message to policy makers and mobilize communities of color and women on these issues. We believe that without culturally appropriate care in all aspects of health care provision, the disparate health statistics that you are reviewing today as part of the testimony of our partners will continue.

Black and Latino Oregonians' health is 30 – 50% more likely to be negatively affected by diabetes, arthritis, asthma, heart attack, stroke and high blood pressure, and Asian Pacific Islanders are over-affected by high blood pressure. For all the affected communities, assuring that women have access to culturally competent care is critical. They serve their families in many roles including as the gateway for their families into health care and as long-term caregivers for multiple generations. Because of this women engage with the health care system in ways that are often different from the ways men do.

Pregnancy and childbirth are areas where cultural competency and sensitivity on the part of the medical professionals can affect the outcomes of care for a lifetime. As long as women live on average longer than men, there will also be a disproportionate number of elderly women needing medical care from a variety of cultural and ethnic communities.

The role of education for health care providers in improving their outcomes for communities of color must be part of the equation for success in Oregon, both in good health and economically as the toll of these conditions challenge families, state services and business.

Please join us in supporting HB 2611 as a step in the right direction for delivery of culturally competent care.

Signed:

Stephen Ying, Chair, Oregon Commission on Asian Affairs and Pacific Islander Affairs



Isaac Dixon, Chair, Oregon Commission on Black Affairs



Andrea Cano, Chair, Oregon Commission on Hispanic Affairs



Stephanie Vardavas, Chair, Oregon Commission for Women



Community Outreach & Partnerships

In 2011-2012 the Commissioners increased the number of collaborative discussions with community groups, legislators and departmental leaders regarding the OCBA's strategic priorities and opportunities for partnership. Out of these meetings, the Commissions have deepened their working relationship with the Governor's Office on Diversity and Inclusion, Portland African American Leadership Forum, Urban League, and with Dr. Crew, Oregon's Chief Education Officer around education gaps. They have also worked to deepen their understanding of best practices in minority contracting and fair housing.

Commissioners have met with community groups and individuals and attended events including:

- City of Portland's Office of Equity & Inclusion, Director Dante James
- African American Chamber of Commerce Meetings/Met with Chamber President Roy Jay
- Oregon Legislator Representative Lew Frederick
- Governor's Office of Diversity & Inclusion, Director Frank Garcia
- Center for Intercultural Organizing Annual Banquet
- Self Enhancement Inc. Event/Met with SEI Executive Director Tony Hopson
- Oregon Consular Corps
- McKenzie River Gathering (MRG) Foundation Event/ Met with MRG's Executive Director Sharon Gary Smith
- Johnell Bell, Director of Equity and Diversity at TriMet
- Say Hey Event presented by Partners in Diversity
- Oregon Legislator Senator Jackie Winters
- Oregon Advocacy Commissions Fundraising training
- Breakfast for Champions - Partners in Diversity/Portland Business Alliance event
- Michael Alexander, Executive Director of the Urban League Portland chapter
- Governor's Diversity & Inclusion Kitchen Cabinet Meeting
- Portland Workforce
- Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum
- Governor's Networking Session
- The Oregon Commission for Women's Women of Achievement Awards 2012 at the Capitol
- The City of Portland's Right to Work session
- Blacks In Government (BIG) event held in Eugene.
- The City of Portland's Fair Housing Advocacy Committee

LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

- Community Safety, including hate crime protections.
- Health outcomes and access to healthcare.
- Education and education disparities.
- Jobs and economic development.
- Stable families and fair housing.

Primary Areas of Focus

In 2010, the Oregon Commission on Black Affairs worked in concert with a number of organizations, including state agencies, social service organizations, community-based groups, and academic institutions to promote and expand its goals of improving the economic, health, and social wellbeing of the African-American community in Oregon. The Commission's primary areas of focus in 2010 were: 1) human relations-reducing racial profiling and hate crimes throughout Oregon, 2) child welfare, 3) health care, 4) environmental justice, and 5) education achievement. This annual report highlights the Commission's 2011-2012 activities and charts the planned course for the coming biennium.

HUMAN RELATIONS

Statistical data has shown a high level of racial profiling in Oregon for people of color, particularly Blacks and African Americans. The Commission has met with Mayor Adams and has requested him to come and speak to the Commission about the police racial profiling issues.

Maria Lisa Johnson, Director of the Office of Human Relations (Portland), provided the following introduction to their mission and activities:

- Eliminate discrimination and bigotry,
- Strengthen inter-group relationships, and
- Foster greater understanding, inclusion, and justice in Portland.

Portland's Office of Human Relations works to build peace and end discrimination. Their work is guided by the principles embodied in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Office of Human Relations has two programs: the Peace Building and New Portlander programs. The Peace Building programs promote awareness of local and global human rights issues through film and dialogue using multiple approaches. The New Portlanders program integrates newcomer communities into the social, political, and economic life of our city.

Community Issues

- Racial profiling by Portland Police
- Eliminating hate crimes throughout the state of Oregon.

Policy Recommendations

- Systematically work with other city and state agencies on strategies to address the needs of minority, poor, and rural communities throughout Oregon.
- Develop techniques to effectively turn community complaints about police misconduct into action and policy.

HUMAN SERVICES AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

According to the Urban League's State of Black Oregon Report (2009), about 7 percent of the children in a foster care setting in 2008, were African American. This number is three times the representation of African Americans in the state's population.

In 2012, the Commission participated in a series of community feedback sessions hosted by the Oregon Department of Human Services and the Oregon Health Authority, which includes the Office of Equity and Inclusion. These sessions, held at the Maranatha Church in NE Portland, brought community groups and members together to review outcomes in child welfare, health access and health

outcomes, mental health access and other key issues for the Black community.

The issues discussed included OCBA's priority issues on the impact of poverty, family stability, economic equity, mental health access, and healthcare outcomes. Out of these discussions and others hosted by the Commissions, the OCBA will be partnering with DHS and OHA to the extent possible, with joint internships and their work in the 10 Year Plan for Oregon. The OCBA is also supporting legislation in the 2013 legislative session that increases access for all including legislation on profiling, hate crimes, TANF support, education disparities, culturally competent care, Section 8 housing discrimination and other key issues.

Access to quality care is vital to overall health and wellness, and health insurance plays a key role. Both in Oregon and nationwide, African Americans experience serious disparities in rates of insurance and access to health care.

In 2012 - 2013 the Oregon Advocacy Commissions, including the OCBA, began participation in a series of community meetings and Delphi surveys on community needs and best practices regarding healthcare in communities of color and for women. This has included the growing role of healthcare workers in improving healthcare outcomes in immigrant and other communities. The need for health insurance for all Oregonians and the importance of school health clinics in maintaining and improving the health of youth of color. The OCBA supports family-oriented healthcare delivery systems and supports legislation that assures granular collection of data on ethnic backgrounds as well as the importance of public policy inclusive of culturally competent care.

At the Advocacy Commissions' legislative priority meeting with departmental leaders and community partners in December of 2012,

the importance of community involvement and outreach in healthcare was of particular interest. This included pre-natal care for all women in Oregon and other issues. The OCBA looks forward to working with OHA and its Office of Equity and Inclusion in growing community-based and family-oriented healthcare in Oregon..

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

The OCBA has a longstanding interest in issues of environmental justice and equity. This has included air quality in North and NE Portland, clean up of environmental sites in North and NE Portland, and development of brownfields statewide.

To this end, the Commission supports legislation aimed at improving environmental factors that challenge communities of color and women in Oregon. This includes proposals regarding brownfield development and other issues.

The OCBA has been an active partner with the Oregon Environmental Justice Task Force.

The Oregon Environmental Justice Task Force has received a **National Achievements in Environmental Justice Award** from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for effectively implementing Oregon's environmental justice legislation and incorporating environmental justice considerations into state agency programs. The EJTF was one of five environmental partnerships' to receive recognition.

What does environmental justice mean?

- Environmental justice is equal protection from environmental and health hazards, and meaningful public participation in decisions that affect the environment in which people live, work, learn, practice spirituality and play. "Environmental justice communities" include minority and low-

income communities, tribal communities, and other communities traditionally underrepresented in public processes.

EDUCATION

African American students can perform well academically when they have school environments similar to those of traditionally high-achieving students. A recent longitudinal study examined academic outcomes in mathematics for low-income, middle school African American, Latino and White students. Regardless of race, these students did well due to greater engagement in academic activities; an internal locus of control; positive school attitude; and positive self-esteem (Borman & Overman, 2004).

As early as third grade, a sizable performance gap is evident between Black and White students on Oregon state examinations. The Commission on Black Affairs has researched ways to address this education achievement gap. This report offers highlights and recommended courses of action for local educators, universities, state policymakers, and other local political and community leaders.

For Local Educators

- Develop and implement different strategies and approaches for working effectively with the families of color.
- Organize and sponsor workshops for training school board members on issues related to the academic achievement of African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities.
- Strongly consider establishing focused support programs during the freshman year that enhance a personalized, caring school culture to respond to the high dropout rate for African-American males between eighth and ninth grades and during the freshman year.

- Give priority status to professional development and in-service opportunities that provide current Oregon teachers with the knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary to help eliminate school violence, ameliorate the effects of poverty on learning, and enhance cultural responsiveness.
- Target resources to determine effective strategies for parental empowerment, enrichment and development as one method of identifying why students are not achieving at acceptable levels and what can be done to help them.
- Work with community leaders, establish mechanisms to empower parents and community members in the decision making process used to place students in certain tracks or in special education programs.
- Implement a multifaceted approach to reverse the trends of increased dropout rates of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities, including early identification of students and active outreach to parents and caregivers of students at risk of dropping out.
- Assist students to reach performance expectations by providing educational opportunities before and after school and in the summers.

For Universities

- Ensure that teachers are prepared to effectively serve a multicultural, multiracial student population by deepening teacher knowledge in the areas of literacy, culturally responsive teaching, relationship building, differentiated instruction, and best-teaching practices.
- Strengthen teacher preparation programs by including a requirement for a minimum of 20 weeks of student teaching and coursework on critical

issues in education, such as the achievement gap and its causes.

- Present teaching as a viable occupation for undergraduate and graduate students of color.
- Provide minority students with the information and support they need to qualify for, enroll, and remain in postsecondary education until they complete a certificate or degree program so the achievement gap does not continue in their lives as an economic gap.
- Examine overcrowding in public schools as an influence on student performance and make recommendations about desirable class sizes to policymakers.
- Organize and conduct community forums that will review and discuss the academic performances of students in the community.
- Hold school administrators and policymakers accountable for the academic performance of students.
- Prepare and circulate community achievement report cards that document goals for and progress on closing the achievement gap.
- Push local political leaders to be actively involved in local community efforts to address the achievement gap.
- Eliminate disparities in student discipline.

Eliminating the debilitating disparities in academic performance will command extraordinary leadership and involvement in the governor's office, in the Legislative Assembly, in city halls, in teacher preparation programs, in corporate suites, in churches, synagogues, and mosques, in civic and community groups, in families and, of course, in schools throughout Oregon . There is no single answer, no single point of responsibility.

The education disparity between African-American and White students is at epidemic portions and if not immediately addressed will subject a generation of students to a life of poverty, unemployment, and substandard living. All of us have a stake in the outcome and a role in reform – as parents, as citizens, as taxpayers, as educators, as people determined to move Oregon forward.

Bridging the existing divides will challenge us, but it is not a mission impossible unless we lack the will to engage it.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

- Work with public agencies to replicate minority contracting processes statewide.
- Facilitate discussions with colleges and universities on building majors around entrepreneurship.
- Assist people of color in accessing job training/re-training resources.
- Open discussions with lenders on the availability of loans for African American small businesses.

References

Oregon African American Family Commission

Oregon Child Welfare Task Force

Oregon Department of Human Services

Oregon Environmental Justice Task Force

Oregon Health Plan

Oregon Office of Equity and Inclusion

[APPENDIX A]

Oregon Hate Crime Laws

Internship Findings and Final Report

Wes García

Introduction and Overview

This internship was created in a joint venture by the Oregon Commission on Hispanic Affairs, Oregon Commission on Black Affairs, Oregon Commission on Asian Affairs, the Oregon Department of Justice, Oregon Advocacy Commission, and supervised by Professor Carrasco. The purpose of this position was to look at Oregon hate crime laws and compare them to other states' laws and federal statutes for possible improvements. The position started in the middle of May 2012 and ended August 2nd, 2012. Over that time it has become my opinion that the areas of research and recommendations divide largely into two parts, law and policy. While most of the focus has been on legal comparisons and investigation for Oregon-specific laws, some policy recommendations are also made. Finally, at the end of this report are suggestions for future research and study that would be beneficial for the prevention of hate crimes, and what a possible legislative amendment could look like based on this research.

Background

Almost all states have some legislation regarding hate crimes or bias-motivated crimes. One of the general features of a hate crime law is that it prohibits certain actions by one person motivated by bias against another based on the other's characteristics. Generally speaking that characteristic is immutable but states do have the ability under a rational relation basis to create other categories for protection. Most states have provisions for categories such as race, color, religion, and national origin' ancestry ethnicity sex, gender, or gender identity, sexual orientation, and disability. However, some states have created provisions for such characteristics as age,¹ creed,² political affiliation,³ alienage,⁴ and membership in an organization.⁵

Generally, there are three ways states punish bias-motivated crimes. The first is to create a new independent crime, which outlines specific conduct that is being regulated and list punishments. The second enhances the penalty for committing a parallel crime if the offense was motivated by bias. Third, there are statutes that give the court discretion to increase the punishment of the individual if they find their actions were motivated by bias, usually by adding more time or increasing the level of offense.

Oregon's Criminal Statutes and Constitutional challenges

Oregon's two main criminal statutes are the first type of bias-crime statutory construction.⁶ Intimidation in the first degree requires two or more people acting together and covers physical injuries and threats. Intimidation in the second degree only requires one person and covers damages to property, offensive physical contact, threats to the target individual, and threats to individual's family. There is also a civil provision that allows someone to sue civilly for a violation of either of the first two.⁷ In the past there have been challenges to the statutes that help describe their boundaries and how they provide protections. The following is a discussion of the major cases challenging the constitutionality of Oregon's intimidation statutes.

¹ See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4001; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.085; Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.1; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.2231, subd. 4, § 609.595, subd. 1(a) and 2, 609.749, subd. 3(1); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-111; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.30, 240.31, and 485.05; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455.

² See, e.g., 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-7.1 and 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-5-3.2(a)(10); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 45-5-221 and 45-5-222; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:6.I(g).

³ See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.1; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-560; W. Va. Code § 61-6-21.

⁴ See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-58; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-53-3 (repealed, eff. July 2, 1998).

⁵ See, e.g. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2.A

⁶ ORS 166.165, 166.155. Intimidation in the first and second degree, respectively.

⁷ ORS 30.198.

State v. Plowman held that ORS 166.165 is not void under either the Oregon Constitution or United States Constitution for vagueness or violations of free expression.⁸ The appeals court below affirmed the defendant’s conviction per curiam only citing State v. Hendrix 107 Or. App. 734 (1991) decided that same day.⁹

Plowman and three codefendants attacked two Mexican men at a convenience store while shouting “white power,” calling them wetbacks, and demanding the victims speak English.¹⁰ A jury found Plowman and two friends guilty of violating ORS 166.165, among other charges.¹¹ Plowman argued that the statute’s phrasing “because of their perception of [the victim’s] race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation” was unconstitutionally vague under both the Oregon and Federal Constitution due process clauses and allowed for prosecution whenever one of the categories was involved.¹² The Court rejected the argument under both constitutions saying the statute is sufficiently clear and explicit about what conduct is forbidden and the phrase “because of their perception” simply means their perception does not have to be accurate.¹³ Further, the term “because of” does not allow prosecution whenever races of the parties differ; rather it requires the state to show a causal connection between perception and conduct.¹⁴

Plowman also argued that the statute restrains his right to free expression of his opinion and his right to speak under both the Oregon and Federal Constitution because, “a violation of it ‘must necessarily be proved by the content of his speech or associations.’”¹⁵ The Court rejected this under both constitutions saying the statute is prohibiting effects, not expressions of opinions or target conduct on basis of expressive content respectively.¹⁶

Finally, Plowman reiterated the principles stated in State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, (1982), categorizing laws possibly violating Or. Const. art. I, § 8 into one of three types: (1) laws directed at speech *per se*; (2) laws directed at speech-caused harm; and (3) laws directed at harm *per se* and do not refer to speech.¹⁷ Plowman held that the statute falls into the third category because it does not refer to speech and, “Persons can commit that crime without speaking a word, and holding no opinion other than their perception of the victim’s characteristics.”¹⁸ The Court upheld the trial court’s verdict.¹⁹ Plowman is followed by 18 other courts and distinguished in three concurring and dissents only.²⁰

State v. Hendrix held ORS 166.165 does not violate the free expression provisions under the Oregon or US Constitution, nor is it unconstitutionally vague under either constitution’s due process clauses.²¹ Hendrix arises out of the same event as Plowman, beating two Mexican men at a convenience store while shouting racial insults.²² Hendrix differs from Plowman because the defendant claimed he himself never made any statement about race or national origin during the beatings.²³ A jury found Hendrix and two friends guilty of violating ORS 166.165, among other charges.²⁴ On appeal,

⁸ 314 Or. 157 (1992)(en banc), certiorari denied 508 U.S. 974 (1993).

⁹ Plowman, 107 Or. App. 782 (1991).

¹⁰ 314 Or. at 160.

¹¹ Id. at 159.

¹² Id. at 161

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Id. at 162.

¹⁵ Id. at 163.

¹⁶ Id. at 163-64.

¹⁷ Id. at 164 (citing State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402 (1982)).

¹⁸ 314 Or. at 165.

¹⁹ Id. at 169.

²⁰ LEXIS, 05-16-2012; See: City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or. 480, 494 (1994); State v. Maynard, 138 Or. App. 647, 660 (1996) *vacated*, 327 Or. 582 (1998) and *adhered to on reconsideration*, 168 Or. App. 118 (2000); State v. Stoneman, 132 Or. App. 137 (1994) *rev'd*, 323 Or. 536 (1996).

²¹ State v. Hendrix, 107 Or. App. 734 (1991)(en banc), *aff'd* 314 Or. 170, certiorari denied 508 U.S. 974.

²² Id. at 737-38.

²³ Hendrix at 738.

²⁴ Id. at 736.

the court found that even though Hendrix himself did not shout racial epithets, a jury could infer his motive by his actions, which includes participating in the beating after his friends attacked and shouted at the victims.²⁵

Hendrix also claimed the statute was unconstitutional under the free expression provisions of both the Oregon and US Constitution because it punishes belief.²⁶ The court rejected this argument saying the statute regulates physical attacks that are the results of the opinions, not the opinions of subjects of communication themselves.²⁷

Hendrix further claimed, the statutory phrase “because of their perception of” is vague, lacks certainty, and therefore violates the privileges and immunities clause in the Oregon and US Constitution.²⁸ The court said the statute was not so vague because “a person of common intelligence can understand from its language the conduct that is prohibited.”²⁹ Also, the statute is, “sufficiently explicit to provide notice of what conduct is forbidden” under the due process clause of the US Constitution Fourteenth Amendment.³⁰ The court affirmed Hendrix’s conviction.³¹ Hendrix is followed by two other courts.³²

Hendrix was appealed to the Supreme Court of Oregon but on evidentiary issues, not constitutional ones.³³ The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the conviction saying that even though Hendrix never himself shouted racial insults, a jury could still infer his intent by his participation in the beatings while his codefendants shouted the racial insults.³⁴

State v. Beebe held that ORS 166.155 does not deny equal protection under the Oregon or US Constitution and it is constitutionally permissible under a rational basis to enhance punishment for conduct motivated by racial animus.³⁵ Beebe was charged with violating ORS 166.155 by throwing a man to the ground intent to harass, annoy, and alarm because of the victim’s race.³⁶

Beebe claimed the statute denied equal protection under both the Oregon and US Constitution because, “. . . it gives greater protection to a victim who is assaulted because of his race, color, religion or national origin than to another person who is assaulted for some other reason.”³⁷ The court denied Beebe’s claim because, “[a]nyone may be a victim of bigotry” and, “[t]he statute distinguishes between acts of harassment which are motivated by racial . . . animus and [those] which are not. . .”³⁸

Beebe held that it is constitutionally permissible under a rational basis to enhance punishment for conduct motivated by racial animus if there is a rational basis for the distinction.³⁹ The court found there was a rational basis because of legislative concern for social harm where, “[s]uch confrontations therefore readily—and commonly do—escalate from individual conflicts to mass disturbances.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, Beebe said previous enhancements based on

²⁵ Id. at 738.

²⁶ Id. at 739.

²⁷ Id. at 739-740.

²⁸ Id. at 740.

²⁹ Id. at 740-741.

³⁰ Id. at 741.

³¹ Id. at 742.

³² LEXIS, 05-16-2012.

³³ State v. Hendrix, 314 Or. 170 (1992)(en banc).

³⁴ Id. at 174.

³⁵ 67 Or. App. 738 (1984).

³⁶ Id. at 740.

³⁷ Id. at 741.

³⁸ Id.

³⁹ Id. at 742

⁴⁰ Id.

conduct or intent, such as and murder of a police officer or kidnapping for ransom, have been upheld as valid.⁴¹ The appeals court reversed and remanded the trial court's sustaining of Beebe's demurrer.⁴²

Simpson v. Burrows held that an award of punitive tort damages for "true threats" under the intimidation statutes was not barred by Oregon Constitution Article I, § 8 general prohibition of punitive damages based solely on expressive conduct.⁴³ Simpson owned a town lodge in Christmas Valley Oregon and alleged that Burrows circulated and mailed letters to town residents that were hostile to Simpson because she was a lesbian.⁴⁴ Among other claims, Simpson sued under ORS 30.190 (later renumbered 30.198) for the tort of intimidation under ORS 166.155.⁴⁵

Burrows argued punitive damages under ORS 30.190(2)(b) are barred by Or.Const. Art. I, § 8, which prevents punitive damages for actions based solely on expressive conduct, because his intimidation via letters was solely expressive conduct.⁴⁶ However, Simpson said "true threats" are not protected expression under the Oregon Constitution and plaintiffs can be awarded punitive damages for true threats.⁴⁷ The court said, "The proper inquiry is 'whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.'"⁴⁸ Based on the nature and content of Burrow's letters, the court found they were true threats and not entitled to constitutional prevention of punitive damages.⁴⁹

In conclusion, courts have found the intimidation statutes ORS 166.165, 166.155, and 30.198 constitutional because they regulate conduct, not the speech or content. Further, the provisions are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because they clearly outline what conduct is prohibited. Also, the statutes do not afford more protection to people who are assaulted due to their category because anyone may be a victim of bigotry. Finally, punitive damages are allowed for intimidation tort claims if they are a "true threats" because "true threats" don't have Constitutional expression protections.

Provisions not included in Oregon's laws

When comparing Oregon hate crime provisions to other states and federal statutes there are two main areas where additions could be made. The first is in the category of classifications not covered, the second area is conduct not covered. Categories include age, gender, ancestry, homelessness, and ethnicity. Conduct includes interfering with exercise of civil rights, and disturbing religious meetings at their meeting places.

Categories

The category of age contextually deals mostly with the elderly and is often based on the actual or perceived vulnerability of the elderly.⁵⁰ According to the US Department of justice, "'The prevailing stereotype of elderly fraud victims is that they are poorly informed, socially isolated individuals -- potentially suffering from mental deterioration-- who cling to old-fashioned ideas of politeness and manners that interfere with their ability to detect fraud.'"⁵¹ The

⁴¹ Id. at 741-742.

⁴² Id. at 742.

⁴³ 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (2000).

⁴⁴ Id. at 1113.

⁴⁵ Id.

⁴⁶ Id. at 1129, (citing Hall v. The May Dept Stores, 292 Or. 131, 146-47 (1981) (award of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress accomplished by speech runs afoul of speech protections of Art. I, § 8 of Oregon Constitution); Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or. 99, 119 (1979) (punitive damages not recoverable when tort liability based on the content of speech)).

⁴⁷ Id.

⁴⁸ Id. at 1129-30 (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir.1996)).

⁴⁹ Id. at 1130.

⁵⁰ Dylan Fallik, Incomplete Protection: The Inadequacy of Current Penalty Enhancement Provisions in Detering Fraud Schemes Targeting the Elderly, 18 Elder L.J. 335, 338 (2011)

⁵¹ Id. at 338- 339.

American Association of Retired Persons and U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging also discuss the victimization of elderly people as an issue mostly in regards to fraud.⁵² While fraud itself is not an action covered by the current or suggested amendments to the Oregon intimidation statutes, the concern helps show the need in affording protections to the classification of age. Furthermore, “[c]ompared with violent crime victims in other age groups, elderly victims of non-lethal violence are less likely to use self-protective measures, such as arguing with the offender, running away, calling for help, or attacking the offender.”⁵³

The category of gender is arguably the biggest gap for classification coverage given American history regarding gender discrimination, women’s suffrage, and feminism. In fact, many states already include provisions for gender or sex.⁵⁴ While it may be self evident, Weisburd and Levin note:

While the forms of gender-related crime vary, the message is constant; and it is a message of domination, power, and control. Socially constructed gender roles, predominantly characterized by male domination and female subordination, are enforced by various means along a coercive continuum. Moreover, the weak societal response in opposition reinforces the message that women are legitimate victims, appropriate targets for rage or outlets for anger.⁵⁵

Furthermore, “[r]ecognition of a gender category would properly place gender-motivated deprivations of civil rights on equal legal footing with other analogous deprivations based on race, national origin, religion, and sexual orientation.”⁵⁶ Legitimizing gender as a protected class would “It also would send a clear message that gender-motivated crime is not merely a “private” or “family” matter, but instead a status-based civil rights violation that has the effect of denying an entire class of citizens of their rights.”⁵⁷

Many states also include the category of ancestry.⁵⁸ “Ancestry may be defined as ‘family descent or lineage.’”⁵⁹ The term “ancestry” can help to cover categories of individuals that don’t quite fit in categories such as race, but are often still subject to bias based on their category. For example, often “race” is used interchangeably with “ethnicity,”

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ Helia Garrido Hull, *The Not-So-Golden Years: Why Hate Crime Legislation Is Failing A Vulnerable Aging Population*, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 387, 392 (2009).

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-702.C.14; See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, and 1170.75; D.C. Code Ann. § 22-4001; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-7.1(a); Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.1; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:107.2; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4684-A; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.147b; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.2231, subd. 4, § 609.595, subd. 1(a) and 2, 609.749, subd. 3(1); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-301; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.035; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-111; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:6.l(g); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:12-1.e, 2C:33-4.d, and 2C:44-3.e; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.30, 240.31, and 485.05; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-14-04; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-38; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-13 (repealed, eff. July 12, 1998); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455; W. Va. Code § 61-6-21; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.080(1). Hawaii Revised Statutes § 846-51.

⁵⁵ Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, *"on the Basis of Sex": Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes*, 5 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 21, 27 (1994)

⁵⁶ *Id.* at 42

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 42-43

⁵⁸ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6, 422.7, 422.75, and 1170.75; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103(5)(n), 18-9-111(2), and 18-9-121; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(2) and § 4209(e)(1)(v); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.085; Idaho Code § 18-7902; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/12-7.1 and 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-3.2(a)(10); Iowa Code Ann. § 729A.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4684-A; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-301; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-111; N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.30, 240.31, and 485.05; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 850; R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-38; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-309; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.080(1); W. Va. Code § 61-6-21; Wis. Stat. § 939.645(1)(b).

⁵⁹ Juan F. Perea, *Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII*, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 832 (1994).

“ancestry,” “culture,” “color,” “national origin,” and even “religion.”⁶⁰ However, “...individuals who share skin color often have very different ancestry, as is the case for sub-Saharan Africans, New Guinea highlanders, and Australian aborigines...”⁶¹ Furthermore, “‘national origin’ does not extend to many other circumstances in which the country of one’s origin is not at issue. For example, light skinned individuals who have an African-American ancestor or atheists who have Jewish ancestry are not covered by the ‘national origin’ concept.”⁶² Ancestry would be an important inclusion to Oregon’s intimidation statutes because it would provide protection to people who don’t easily fit in one of the existing categories.

Homelessness as a protectable category might be debatable since it is not an immutable characteristic that one is born into.⁶³ It’s only recently that states have been adding homelessness as a protected category under hate crimes.⁶⁴ Maine was the first to do so.⁶⁵ However, if the reason for not including a classification as a protected class is because the individual was not born into it, this would leave many people with disabilities without protection. The same could be said for religion.

Furthermore, “homeless people have been recognized as a class in court in order to bring suit against city policies that adversely affected or discriminated against them as a group because they were homeless.”⁶⁶ For example, in Pottinger v. City of Miami the court called homelessness an involuntary status.⁶⁷ Pottinger held that Miami’s practice of arresting homeless persons for performing such activities as sleeping, standing, and congregating in public places violated Eighth Amendment and right to travel.⁶⁸ Also, state ordinances under which homeless persons were arrested were unconstitutionally overbroad, the homeless individuals rights to privacy were not violated, and the seizure of their personal belongings violated the Fourth Amendment.⁶⁹ Homeless people are a vulnerable population because “Children, families, the mentally ill, veterans, victims of domestic abuse, people with disabilities, and people of color make up the fabric of the homeless population.”⁷⁰ Also, homeless people, lacking the resources for adequate living conditions, would not likely be able to seek legal protections or remedies. If anything, “In many communities, the homeless have a tenuous relationship with law enforcement and fail to report acts of violence because of a perception that the police do not care what happens to the homeless.”⁷¹ Implementing homelessness as a categorical protection would help deliver the message that bias-motivated violence against one of the more helpless groups of people in society is unacceptable.

Finally, the category of ethnicity is also not in Oregon’s intimidation statutes, but is included in other states.⁷² The category of ethnicity is a bit broader than the others in that it, “consists of a set of ethnic traits that may include, but are not limited to: race, national origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which contribute to a sense of distinctiveness among members of the group.”⁷³ While similar to ancestry, it is not as

⁶⁰ Sharona Hoffman, Is There A Place for "Race" As A Legal Concept?, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 1093, 1096-97 (2004)

⁶¹ Id. at 1118.

⁶² Id. at 1147.

⁶³ See, Kate Davidson, Debating Homeless Hate Crimes, NPR, Oct. 18, 2009, available at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113916951>.

⁶⁴ Jeff McDonald, Should "Bum-Bashing" Be A Hate Crime?, 15 Pub. Int. L. Rep. 115, 116 (2010)

⁶⁵ See, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1151(8)(B) (West, Current with emergency legislation through Chapter 702 of the 2011 Second Regular Session of the 125th Legislature)

⁶⁶ Raegan Joern, Mean Streets: Violence Against the Homeless and the Makings of A Hate Crime, 6 Hastings Race & Poverty L. J. 305, 325 (2009)

⁶⁷ 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1562-65, 1992 WL 414704 (S.D. Fla. 1992)

⁶⁸ Id. at 1569.

⁶⁹ Id. at 1575, 1573.

⁷⁰ Sarah Finnane Hanafin, Legal Shelter: A Case for Homelessness As A Protected Status Under Hate Crime Law and Enhanced Equal Protection Scrutiny, 40 Stetson L. Rev. 435, 439 (2011)

⁷¹ Id. at 458.

⁷² See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-5-13; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-181b (repealed, 2000); 2000 Conn. Acts 00-72, §§ 1 to 3 (Reg. Sess.); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.085; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-301.

⁷³ Perea, supra at 833.

reliant on family lineage. One of the best example areas it comes up in is the distinction between “Latinos” and “Hispanics” living in the United States.⁷⁴ Sandrino-Glasser discusses the difficulties the US Census Bureau has had with trying to categorize American citizens and immigrants who were from a wide variety of Central and South American origin, but still didn’t identify with the categories of “Spanish” or “Hispanic.”⁷⁵ Still, these people are likely to be perceived as belonging to a minority group and associated with the status, which has caused problems with issues of equal protection and other rights.⁷⁶ For this reason, Oregon would benefit by the addition of ethnicity to the intimidation statutes because it would provide protection to people who don’t easily fit in one of the existing categories.

Conduct

Compared to Oregon, some states have statutes that reference or are similar to federal criminal civil rights laws.⁷⁷ Generally, they make it a hate crime if the offender, because of bias-motivation, interferes with the exercise of rights under the US Constitution, State Constitution, or laws of the United States.⁷⁸ For example, Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6 and 422.7 are very similar to 18 U.S.C.A. § 242. It is because of this that the court in People v. Lashley noted several rights protected by California or federal law might have been involved in the defendant’s shooting of a black person.⁷⁹ One of those rights included the constitutional right to privacy.⁸⁰ Another state whose bias law is similar to 18 U.S.C.A. § 242 is Massachusetts.⁸¹ In Com. v. Stephens, some Cambodian people were attacked near their home.⁸² Among other things the court said the victims had the state constitutional right to be safe and secure and to use one’s property peacefully and the right to use public streets and sidewalks free from discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, or national origin.⁸³ If similar provisions were included in the Oregon Intimidation statutes, it could likely cover conduct that isn’t proscribed through ORS 166.165 or 166.155.

Some states passed statutes proscribing conduct that disturbs religious meetings or assemblies.⁸⁴ Others include any meeting that has a lawful purpose.⁸⁵ Challenges to such statutes have arisen under vagueness of the word “disturb” and conduct prohibited but have been unsuccessful.⁸⁶ Further, some challenges have been made saying that some of the

⁷⁴ Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 69, 123 (1998)

⁷⁵ Id. at 130.

⁷⁶ Id. at 150.

⁷⁷ See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 242, 245, and 42 U.S.C.A. § 3631. Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6 and 422.7; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 37. See also People v. Lashley, 1 Cal. App. 4th 938, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 634–35 (2d Dist. 1991), construction approved of and adopted in In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th 698, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365, 1373 n.5 (1995); In re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (6th Dist. 1993); Com. v. Stephens, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 515 N.E.2d 606, 608–09 (1987).

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.76.110; Cal. Penal Code §§ 422.6 and 422.7; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-58; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(1); Iowa Code Ann. § 729.5.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2931; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 37; N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40-c; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-14-04 and 12.1-14-05; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-309; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.3; W. Va. Code § 61-6-21(b) and (c). See also, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1027; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-344; Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 25, § 1506.9.

⁷⁹ 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629, 635–36 (2d Dist. 1991).

⁸⁰ Id. at 636 (citing Cal. Const. art. I, § 1).

⁸¹ See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 37 (West 2012).

⁸² 25 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 117-120 (1987).

⁸³ Id. at 124 (citing Mass. Declaration of Rights, art. 1 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §§ 92A and 98).

⁸⁴ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 302; D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1114; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 871.01; Idaho Code § 18-6201 (repealed, eff. July 1, 1994); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 38; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 752.525; Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-17; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201.270; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-13-1; N.Y. Penal Law § 240.21; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(7); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 915; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-11-1; S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-520; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415; W. Va. Code § 61-6-13.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 871.01; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 79.450.2; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-13-1; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-11-1; Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415.

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Riley v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d at 819; Weidner v. State, 380 So. 2d at 1286; S.H.B. v. State, 355 So. 2d at 1176. See also, State v. Orzen, 493 P.2d at 768; D.L.B. v. State, 707 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1998), decision approved, 720 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1998).

proscribed conduct of interference might include protected speech.⁸⁷ This might be an issue with Oregon given the extra protection the state gives to freedom of expression, which is why part of this area is recommended for further evaluation. Still, the court in Riley held that the defendant's speech or views were not the target of the statute, but rather the manner which it was conveyed.⁸⁸

Finally, there is a small addition to the Oregon statutes that could be made in regards to State civil actions, ORS 30.200. This is the inclusion of the Attorney General to the list of State officials who can pursue a civil claim for relief. The addition of the State Attorney General is not uncommon, as other states have already done so.⁸⁹ In 2009, The Oregon Attorney General John Kroger appointed Portland lawyer Diane Schwartz Sykes to lead the Oregon Department of Justice Civil Rights program, which had been eliminated during the recession of the 1980s.⁹⁰ In personal interviews and conversations with Sykes, she expressed interest for her division to also be able to pursue civil actions for hate crimes, which might also lighten the load on the local District Attorney.⁹¹ In instances where the DA cannot meet the burden of proof for a criminal charge, a civil remedy can serve to ensure that the victim still receives compensation for his or her injuries and injunctive relief to prevent the reoccurrence of hate crimes by a perpetrator.⁹²

Provisions not likely includable

One of the areas I was asked to research was the constitutionality a "fighting words" doctrine with bias motivation in mind, and the Oregon harassment statute ORS 166.065. The idea was that some states have statutes that proscribe verbal harassment and it wasn't readily apparent if Oregon did. My research showed that the harassment statute does have a sort of "fighting words" provision but it was held unconstitutional in 2008. Further research suggests that the OR Constitution would not support a fighting words doctrine since OR does not allow a balancing test for suppression of speech. Also, it is not a historical exception under Robertson. This leaves the clear cutoff at actual threats,⁹³ which is already covered.⁹⁴

The case finding part of the harassment statute unconstitutional is State v. Johnson.⁹⁵ Here, Defendant was charged for making racist, obscene, and homophobic insults over an amplified system to two women, one White one African American, during a traffic stop for about five minutes.⁹⁶ The basis for finding that the statute was unconstitutional under Oregon's constitution was that the phrasing "abusive words or gestures, in a manner intended and likely to provoke a violent response" was facially overbroad because it "extend[s] to political, social, and economic confrontations that range from union picket lines to the protagonists on a host of divisive issues, and thus include a wide range of protected speech."⁹⁷ I'm doubtful that it could be amended to cure the constitutional defect for a few reasons.

First, the Court said the statute may, "protect a hearer or viewer from exposure to a reasonable fear of immediate harm due to certain types of expression, but it cannot criminally punish all harassing or annoying expression."⁹⁸ However,

⁸⁷ See, e.g., Riley, 283 A.2d at 819; Weidner, 380 A.2d at 1286; S.H.B., 355 So. 2d at 1176; People v. Morrisey, 161 Misc. 2d 295, 614 N.Y.S.2d 686 (City Crim. Ct. 1994), aff'd as modified, 172 Misc. 2d 854, 661 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App. Term 1997).

⁸⁸ Riley, 283 A.2d at 824.

⁸⁹ See, e.g., Cal. Civil Code §§ 52(c) and 52.1(a); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 11H; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 307.082; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 354-B:1 et seq.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-21.c; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99D-1(b); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8309(b); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1458; W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-20(b).

⁹⁰ <http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2009/rel100509.shtml> accessed July 30th, 2012.

⁹¹ Interview with Diane Schwartz Sykes, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Unit Oregon Department of Justice, Portland, Or. (Jul. 13, 2012).

⁹² Id.

⁹³ Burrows, supra n. 46.

⁹⁴ ORS 166.165(1)(b), 166.155(1)(c)

⁹⁵ 345 Or. 190 (2008).

⁹⁶ Id. at 192

⁹⁷ Id. at 196.

⁹⁸ Id. at 197.

once it does cross the line of reasonable fear of immediate harm it is already covered by ORS 166.165(1)(b) or 166.155(1)(c). Further, the Court said statutes, "whose real focus is on some underlying harm or offense may survive the adoption of Article I, section 8, while those that focus on protecting the hearer from the message do not."⁹⁹ Also, "The harm that the statute seeks to prevent—harassment or annoyance—generally is one against which the Oregon Constitution does not permit the criminal law to shield individuals when that harm is caused by another's speech."¹⁰⁰

Second, I don't think a "fighting words" provision would survive constitutionality either. Fighting words are an exception to free expression under Champlinsky v. New Hampshire.¹⁰¹ However, Champlinsky uses a balancing test and the Oregon constitution forbids balancing tests for suppression of speech.¹⁰² Further, the Court in Johnson said that the constitutional issues only applied to criminal provisions, and made no comment on civil actions.¹⁰³

Other underlying harm for proscribing speech

However, if there were some other verbal or expressive harm caused to the person the speech was directed at, especially one with bias-motivation, it might be able to survive a constitutional challenge. Research was then directed at seeing if there are any tort standards that could be used as a basis for criminal proscription. After examining Oregon's tort laws the best fit seems to be the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The question then became: under Oregon law, is it possible to include intentional infliction of emotional distress as a criminal offense addition to the intimidation statutes? The answer is likely not for a few reasons. Emotional distress is historically a damages claim, which is already included in the civil intimidation provision. Results of criminalizing intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) could prove unwieldy and ineffective. Oregon law for IIED generally requires some physical injury or contact. Of the few exceptions allowed, few involve bias elements. Of those, the bias aspect is limited to being a factor in consideration with other actions by the defendant, and cannot stand alone. Further, the durational requirements for IIED generally go beyond a single instance. The following cases outline IIED claims.

Generally speaking, emotional distress claims are not allowed without a physical impact or injury, but there can be exceptions to this rule.¹⁰⁴ The exceptions come from intentional torts, including IIED.¹⁰⁵ In order to succeed in a claim for IIED a plaintiff must show: "(1) Defendants intended to inflict severe emotional distress on plaintiff; (2) The acts did cause severe emotional distress and; (3) The defendant's acts consisted of 'some extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct'" or exceeded "'any reasonable limit of social toleration.'"¹⁰⁶ According to McFanty v. Staudenraus no special relationship between the parties for the level of intent necessary, just that the defendant intended to inflict the emotional distress and that it was substantially certain to happen.¹⁰⁷

The following cases outline applicability of a bias motivated IIED provision. In Brewer v. Erwin the court said that insults, ill temper, and offensive jokes are not actionable conduct, and that that people are expected to endure these under contemporary standards of behavior.¹⁰⁸ Arguably, a bias motivated IIED tort might be distinguishable because it involves a level of animosity and harm that goes beyond harsh or inappropriate behavior common in day-to-day life. For example, the court in State v. Beebe said the legislature's rational basis interest for the Intimidation statute ORS 166.155 was valid because bias motivated conduct causes social harm, and wanting to prevent retaliation by the offended group was a

⁹⁹ Id.

¹⁰⁰ Id.

¹⁰¹ 315 US 568 (1942)

¹⁰² State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542, (1996).

¹⁰³ Johnson at 197 n.5.

¹⁰⁴ See Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or. 17, 22–23 (1991); Chouinard v. Health Ventures, 179 Or. App. 507, 513–514 (2002).

¹⁰⁵ Hammond, 312 Or. at 22.

¹⁰⁶ Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 301 Or. 117, 122 (1986) (quoting Hall v. May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or. 131, 135, 137 (1981)); Schiele v. Montes, 231 Or. App. 43, 48 (2009).

¹⁰⁷ 321 Or. 532, 543-551 (1995).

¹⁰⁸ 287 Or 435, 457 (1979).

legitimate state interest.¹⁰⁹ This could be bolstered by the case MacCrone v. Edwards Center, Inc. which states that even a single incident may be actionable.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, courts examine extreme and outrageous behavior as a fact-specific inquiry “on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances.”¹¹¹ Also, “[D]epending on the circumstances, insults or harassment directed to individuals on the basis of historically disfavored personal characteristics more readily transgress contemporary social bounds than do other forms of antagonistic behavior.”¹¹² So, bias-based insults or harassment differ in kind from other insults and are potentially offensive in the extreme, satisfying the third element of the tort¹¹³

In Lathrope-Olson, a Native American highway crew woman claimed her supervisor constantly called her “squaw,” made sexist remarks, threatened to push her into traffic, and repeatedly locked her out of the crew van when it was raining or snowing and no other shelter was near.¹¹⁴ The appeals court said that “acts of racism and sexual harassment are not simply rude and boorish, but are more properly characterized as the kind of conduct that a jury could find was intended to inflict deep, stigmatizing and psychic wounds on another person.”¹¹⁵ Further, the court said based on the totality of the circumstances, it was a question for the jury and overturned the trial courts grant of summary judgment to the defendant.¹¹⁶

However, in Clemente v. State, plaintiff brought action against her employer for gender discrimination, retaliation for making a gender discrimination complaint, and IIED.¹¹⁷ The trial court dismissed the claims based on issue preclusion.¹¹⁸ The appeals court reversed the trial court’s ruling on issue preclusion but said the court did not err in dismissing the IIED claim.¹¹⁹ The court said the plaintiff, “was not exposed to violence, nor was she repeatedly and viciously ridiculed. At most, she was subjected to an insensitive, mean-spirited supervisor who might have engaged in gender-based, discriminatory treatment...”¹²⁰

Thus, considering that IIED claims must be examined in the totality of the circumstances, it appears that bias-motivated speech or expression would only be a factor in a situation and is accompanied with other affronts to the individual. Unfortunately, this would likely make criminalizing bias-motivated IIED not very functional for trying to proscribe harassing speech or conduct.

Policy findings and comparisons

The other segment of this internship deals in part with policy findings in relation to hate crimes and some of the approaches other states have taken to help ameliorate the problem. As mentioned earlier, the scope of the internship focused mostly on legal aspects of Oregon hate crime laws. Later in this report are recommendations for future research, particularly in regards to Oregon-specific policies that could be enacted. The following is a general overview of ideas suggested and implemented by other states and organizations. Of these, there are three main areas that policies tend to focus on. They are school education, police training and policies, and some alternative division of government working with local hate crime policies.

¹⁰⁹ 67 Or. App. 738, 742 (1984)

¹¹⁰ 160 Or App 91, 100–101 (1999), See also Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 333 Or 401, 412–413 (2002) (defendant employer exposed plaintiff security guard to physical attack by concertgoers whom plaintiff had detained earlier).

¹¹¹ Lathrope-Olson v. Oregon Dept. of Transp., 128 Or App 405, 408 (1994).

¹¹² Williams v. Tri-County Metropolitan Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 153 Or App 686, 690 (1998)

¹¹³ See also Hofsheier v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 154 Or App 538, 543 (1998) (“in Oregon, [racial] discrimination may form the basis for common law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress”).

¹¹⁴ Lathrope-Olson, at 407.

¹¹⁵ Id. at 408.

¹¹⁶ Id.

¹¹⁷ Clemente v. State, 227 Or App 434, 436 (2009).

¹¹⁸ Id.

¹¹⁹ Id. at 442.

¹²⁰ Id. at 443.

Education

Education of children through public schools is an approach that aims to nip bias-motivated action in the bud, hopefully before it even becomes a problem for the individual later in life. For example, California enacted legislation for schools to “Adopt policies directed toward creating a school environment in kindergarten and grades 1 to 12, inclusive, that is free from discriminatory attitudes and practices and acts of hate violence.”¹²¹ In part, the statute requires schools to, “Prepare guidelines for the design and implementation of local programs and instructional curricula that promote understanding, awareness, and appreciation of the contributions of people with diverse backgrounds and of harmonious relations in a diverse society.”¹²² The education is not only for the students but is also for teachers and administrators for learning how to recognize bias-motivated conduct and address it.¹²³ In furtherance of this, California requires their education department to provide training for school personnel on hate crime issues.¹²⁴ Schools and the children attending them are not immune to incidents of hate crimes.¹²⁵ Policies that educate school personnel and students about hate crime and diversity also help protect the children from possible bias-motivated harassment and violence in the school.¹²⁶

The importance of youth education is also recognized by the federal government. For example, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention “provided a \$50,000 grant for the development of a school-based curriculum to address prevention and treatment of hate crimes by juveniles” and the “Education Development Center Inc. (EDC) developed a curriculum and pilot tested it in schools in Massachusetts, New York, and Florida. EDC in fiscal year 1996 worked to provide the curriculum and related training to school districts and juvenile justice agencies.”¹²⁷

Police

Public policy with state police is one of the bigger areas of policy concern. Despite all the hate crime legislation that could be passed and written in books, arguably “. . . bias crimes do not legally exist until the police say they do.”¹²⁸ Bell describes police as ““street-level bureaucrats””¹²⁹ and most hate crime legislation enforcement is based on the discretion of the police.¹³⁰ Often times a bias-motivated crime can go un-charged because of the officer’s lack of training, social norm of not considering an action bias-motivated, or not caring about bias-motivated crimes at all.¹³¹ Some states, including Oregon, have statutes requiring training of law enforcement officers in identifying, addressing, reporting, and recording hate crimes.¹³² Still, the effectiveness of such programs and legislation would likely be bolstered by placing extra emphasis on recognizing hate crimes and doing follow-up training afterwards.¹³³

From personal experience, Oregon might benefit from having a more publically accessible and better catalogued hate crime report. Oregon Annual Uniform Crime Reports are available as annual compilations on the Oregon State

¹²¹ Cal. Educ. Code § 233(a)(1) (West 2012)

¹²² Cal. Educ. Code § 233(b)(1) (West 2012)

¹²³ Cal. Educ. Code § 233(a)(4)-(7) (West 2012)

¹²⁴ See Cal. Educ. Code § 233.8 (West 2012)

¹²⁵ Daniel R. Clark, Chapter 955: California's Response to Rising Hate Crimes Among California's Youth, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 517, 518 (2001).

¹²⁶ Justin Wieland, Peer-on-Peer Hate Crime and Hate-Motivated Incidents Involving Children in California's Public Schools: Contemporary Issues in Prevalence, Response and Prevention, 11 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 235, 247 (2007)

¹²⁷ Bureau of Justice Assistance, A Policymaker's Guide to Hate Crimes. U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Justice Programs, p. 36. (Mar. 1997), retrieved Jul. 17, 2012 from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/162304.pdf.

¹²⁸ Jeannine Bell, Policing Hatred: Police Bias Units and the Construction of Hate Crime, 2 Mich. J. Race & L. 421, 423 (1997)

¹²⁹ *Id.* at 448 (quoting Michael Lipsky, *Street-Level Bureaucracy* at xi (1980)).

¹³⁰ *Id.* at 454.

¹³¹ *Id.* at 451-456.

¹³² See, e.g., 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 2605/55a(A)31; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 6, § 116B; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 8.34 (requiring training for prosecuting attorneys); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 181.642; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 251(a.1).

¹³³ Bell at 459-60.

Police's website for years going back to 1995.¹³⁴ Part of these reports includes bias-motivated crimes using the FBI's categorical definitions and lists some of the characteristics of the incidents including categories and crimes.¹³⁵ However, they do not show the specific correlation between the categories, i.e. what type of offender committed what time of crime against what type of victim.¹³⁶ Still, this type of reporting would be possible since the forms used in submitting incidents to the Law Enforcement Data System would allow for this.¹³⁷

In regards to what gets reported, one report outlines various reasons why some people don't report hate incidents. These include but are not limited to: lack of knowledge about hate crimes and how the laws are applied, fear of retaliation for reporting, fear of again being victimized by law enforcement or a belief that law enforcement does not want to address hate crimes, lack of proficiency in the English language and of knowing how to report hate crimes, and fear of being identified as an undocumented immigrant and being deported.¹³⁸ In order to address some of these issues, California created a pamphlet in multiple languages that officers can hand out to people they've identified as victims of hate incidents.¹³⁹ The pamphlet seeks to educate people about hate crimes in general, their options if they are a victim, and whom they can get in touch with.¹⁴⁰ One example of outreach I was able to find was Oregon's DOJ website which has a multi-lingual page where people can report hate crimes.¹⁴¹ This was also one of the suggestions in the California Attorney General's report.¹⁴²

The National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) suggests a related strategy of placing "a substation within or close to immigrant neighborhoods. Employing bilingual community service officers, distributing bilingual crime prevention materials, and being open to developing a greater cultural sensitivity can help law enforcement improve relationships, gain the trust of the community, and better help them address local crime problems."¹⁴³ As a success story of such a strategy, the NCPC talks about the WINGS program in Iowa dealt with a local Vietnamese gang terrorizing the ethnic community by hiring a special police officer, training him in key Vietnamese phrases and cultural sensitivity training.¹⁴⁴ Because of this, the local community developed a working relationship with the officer and was not afraid to report incidents for investigation.¹⁴⁵

Alternative division of government

Finally some organizations advocate the creation of an independent governmental body to deal with these specific issues. For example, the California Attorney General's report suggests creating a human relation commissions to sponsor hate violence prevention and response networks and providing it with financial support.¹⁴⁶ This commission would train network participants, develop a standardized directory of services for victims of hate crimes and hate incidents, and include other community organizations and religious institutions in the network that represent the diversity of the population in the area to be served.¹⁴⁷ This would also serve to be a non-uniformed face that individuals could reach out to if they come from a background where they fear law enforcement or military officials.

¹³⁴ http://www.oregon.gov/OSP/CJIS/annual_reports.shtml retrieved Jun. 18, 2012

¹³⁵ Id.

¹³⁶ Id.

¹³⁷ www.oregon.gov/OSP/CJIS/docs/BIAS_FORM.pdf retrieved Jun. 18, 2012

¹³⁸ Reporting Hate Crimes, The California Attorney General's Civil Rights, Commission on Hate Crimes,

<http://caag.state.ca.us/publications/civilrights/reportingHC.pdf> at p. 11.

¹³⁹ <http://oag.ca.gov/civil/content/hatecrimes>, retrieved Jul. 16, 2012.

¹⁴⁰ Id.

¹⁴¹ http://www.doj.state.or.us/help/explain_report_a_crime.shtml retrieved Jul. 16, 2012

¹⁴² <http://caag.state.ca.us/publications/civilrights/reportingHC.pdf> at p. 23.

¹⁴³ <http://www.ncpc.org/topics/hate-crime/strategies/strategy-raising-cultural-awareness> retrieved Jul. 16, 2012.

¹⁴⁴ Id.

¹⁴⁵ Id.

¹⁴⁶ Reporting Hate Crimes, supra at p. 24.

¹⁴⁷ Id.

The commission could also be used for community outreach via different mediums and methods. The NCPC talks about possible means of media outreach that could be accomplished such as television, newspapers, “community events focusing on reducing prejudice and cover the events for the community... festivals, documentaries, and PSAs”¹⁴⁸ It could serve to educate communities not only about diversity issues, but provide them with information about hate crimes and their options, similar to the pamphlet that California’s police hand out.

Areas for future research

While the findings of this research do address some issues, there are still other areas that would be beneficial to look into. Dividing again into two main areas are legal suggestions and policy suggestions. This is not to say future research should be limited to these areas, but they would be great for continuing in this line of work and probably lead to further investigations.

One suggestion is to look into the necessity of “color of law” provisions for government officials and police officers who could possibly be offenders of hate crimes, and their possible state immunity. Government and law enforcement individuals are valued as gatekeepers and guardians for the community. However, to deny that they are human and ignore the shortcomings being human would hinder justice for possible victims of hate crimes by these officials. I am not entirely sure such a provision would be necessary or if there are already related statutes. Still, it would be good to research either way.

Another suggestion is to see about aiding and abating provisions for hate crimes. One of the concerns for hate crimes comes from hate groups and gangs recruiting youth and others for commission of hate crimes. This would be a useful tool in preventing and punishing hate groups that get others to do their bidding, while remaining largely untouched. This would also send a message to the community that groups that advocate and recruit others for hate violence are not tolerated.

Along those lines, some suggestions have been in regards to speech conduct, specifically inciting others to riot. As mentioned before, this might be protected speech under the Oregon constitution but it is still another facet that would better define the boundary of proscribable speech in regards to bias motivation.

Finally, there is the possibility of having anti-cross burning statutes and proscribing other hate symbols. Some states have passed legislation regulating such actions if they are narrowly tailored as threats, on private property, with a certain mens rea requirement.¹⁴⁹

As far as policy research suggestions go, they generally also focus on the three areas of education, police, and governmental commissions. Broadly speaking, it would help to look into Oregon’s education policies. One of the other concerns brought up which was unable to be investigated is what happens to all the hate crime charges after arrest? Are they plea-bargained out? Are they dropped? How many are actually followed through.

In regards to Oregon police training it would be helpful to know the specific instructions and curriculum given to police officers. What are they being taught? What does it encompass? Are they required to have follow-up training or testing years later? If so what is the frequency?

Finally, it would be helpful to know if Oregon is specifically doing anything about diversity educations and bias-motivation education in secondary schools and colleges. Similar to the educational policies mentioned earlier, it would be

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.ncpc.org/topics/hate-crime/strategies/strategy-media-campaigns-about-community-standards-for-tolerance> retrieved Jul. 16, 2012.

¹⁴⁹ See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 11411; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 805; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 876.17, § 876.18 (survived First Amendment challenge in State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1995)), § 876.20; Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 10 (unconstitutional in State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993)); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-12.12(a); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-7-120 (unconstitutional in State v. Ramsey, 311 S.C. 555, 430 S.E.2d 511 (1993)).

worthwhile to see if such policies exist and if not, would Oregon benefit from having them? Again, these suggestions are in no way meant to be limiting, but are guidance for any future investigations that I feel would be helpful with addressing the issue of hate crimes in Oregon.

Possible Legislative Amendment

Below is an outline of what a possible amendment proposal could look like for the Oregon intimidation statutes based on the findings of this research. It's worth noting that there are similarities between this and the proposed 2011 Oregon Senate Bill No 44 from the Oregon Seventy-Sixth Legislative Assembly, which never made it out of committee. In many ways, the suggestions of SB 44 reflect the findings of my research and make some pretty straight-forward suggestions, like renaming "crime of intimidation" to "hate crime." This outline is in no way definitive but could be helpful in guidance for future proposals. The wording in strikethrough signifies deletions, the wording in blue highlights signify additions.

ORS 166.165 could be amended to read:

166.165. (1) Two or more persons acting together commit the ~~crime of intimidation~~ **a hate crime** in the first degree, if the persons:

(a)(A) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause physical injury to another person because of the actors' perception of that person's race, color, religion, **national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness,** disability or sexual orientation or ~~national origin~~; or

(B) With criminal negligence cause physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon because of the actors' perception of that person's race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation or national origin;

(b) Intentionally, because of the actors' perception of another person's race, color, religion, **national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness,** disability or sexual orientation or ~~national origin~~, place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury; or

(c) Commit such acts as would constitute the crime of ~~intimidation~~ **a hate crime** in the second degree, if undertaken by one person acting alone.

(2) A person commits a hate crime in the first degree if the person:

(a) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes physical injury to another person because of the actor's perception of the other person's race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation; or

(b) With criminal negligence causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon because of the actor's perception of the other person's race, color, religion, national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, disability or sexual orientation.

(2) (3) ~~Intimidation~~ A hate crime in the first degree is a Class C felony.

ORS 166.155 could be amended to read:

166.155. (1) A person commits the ~~crime of intimidation~~ a hate crime in the second degree if the person:

(a) Tampers or interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to another because of the person's perception of the other's race, color, religion, national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, disability or sexual orientation or national origin;

(b) Intentionally subjects another to offensive physical contact because of the person's perception of the other's race, color, religion, national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, disability or sexual orientation or national origin; or

(c) Intentionally, because of the person's perception of race, color, religion, national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, disability or sexual orientation or national origin of another or of a member of the other's family, subjects the other person to alarm by threatening:

(A) To inflict serious physical injury upon or to commit a felony affecting the other person, or a member of the person's family; or

(B) To cause substantial damage to the property of the other person or of a member of the other person's family.

(d) Intentionally, because of the person's perception of race, color, religion, national origin, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, disability or sexual orientation of the other interferes with the exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States or of rights secured by the Constitution of Oregon.

(e) Intentionally creates a disturbance of religious meeting or any public meeting that has a lawful purpose. The acts of disturbance of must be such that a reasonable person would expect them to be disruptive. Finally, the acts must, in fact, significantly disturb the assembly.

(2) ~~Intimidation~~ A hate crime in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) For purposes of this section, 'property' means any tangible personal property or real property.

ORS 30.200 could be amended to read:

30.200. (1) If any the Attorney General or a district attorney has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in violation of ORS 166.155 or 166.165, the Attorney General or a district attorney may bring a civil claim for relief in the appropriate court, setting forth facts pertaining to such violation, and request such relief as may be necessary to restrain or prevent such violation. In addition to any other available remedy, the court:

(a) May order the person or group to make restitution in specific amounts to any person who suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of the violation.

(b) May make any additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or property, real or personal, of which the person was deprived as a result of the violation.

(c) May impose a penalty of not more than \$250,000.

(d) Shall award reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees and investigative costs to the Attorney General or district attorney if the Attorney General or district attorney prevails in the action.

(e) May award reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees to a defendant who prevails in an action under this section if the court determines that the Attorney General or district attorney had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting the claim or no reasonable basis for appealing an adverse decision of the trial court.

(2) A temporary restraining order may be granted without prior notice to the person or group if the court finds there is a threat of immediate harm to the public health, safety or welfare. Such a temporary restraining order shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless the person restrained consents that it may be extended for a longer period.

(3) Any claim for relief under this section does not prevent any person from seeking any other remedy otherwise available under law.

ORS 30.198 should be amended to read:

30.198. (1) Irrespective of any criminal prosecution or the result thereof, any person injured by a violation of ORS 166.155 or 166.165 shall have a civil action to secure an injunction, damages or other appropriate relief against any and all persons whose actions are unlawful under ORS 166.155 and 166.165.

(2) Upon prevailing in such action, the plaintiff may recover:

(a) Both special and general damages, including damages for emotional distress; and

(b) Punitive damages.

(3) The court shall award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff in an action under this section. The court may award reasonable attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred by a defendant who prevails in the action if the court determines that the plaintiff had no objectively reasonable basis for asserting a claim or no reasonable basis for appealing an adverse decision of a trial court.

(4) The parent, parents or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor shall be liable for any judgment recovered against such minor under this section, in an amount not to exceed \$5,000.

(5) Actions brought under this section shall be commenced within one year from the violation. However, whenever any complaint is filed by the Attorney General or a district attorney under ORS 30.200 to prevent, restrain or punish violations of ORS 166.155 or 166.165, running of the statute of limitations with respect to every private right of action under this section and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof.

(5) Actions brought under this section shall be commenced within one year from the violation. However, whenever any complaint is filed by the Attorney General or a district attorney under ORS 30.200 to prevent, restrain or punish violations

of ORS 166.155 or 166.165, running of the statute of limitations with respect to every private right of action under this section and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof.

ORS 181.550 could be amended to read:

181.550. (1) All law enforcement agencies shall report to the Department of State Police statistics concerning crimes:

- (a) As directed by the department, for purposes of the Uniform Crime Reporting System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (b) As otherwise directed by the Governor concerning general criminal categories of criminal activities but not individual criminal records.
- (c) Motivated by prejudice based on the perceived race, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness color, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, marital status, political affiliation or beliefs, membership or activity in or on behalf of a labor organization or against a labor organization, physical or mental disability, age, economic or social status or citizenship of the victim.
- (d) And other incidents arising out of domestic disturbances under ORS 133.055 (2) and 133.310 (3).

(2) All law enforcement agencies shall report to the Department of Justice, in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Justice, statistics concerning crimes motivated by prejudice based on the perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation of the victim.

⇒ (3) The Department of State Police shall prepare:

- (a) Quarterly and annual reports for the use of agencies reporting under subsection (1) of this section, and others having an interest therein;
- (b) An annual public report of the statistics on the incidence of crime motivated by prejudice based on the perceived race, age, ancestry, ethnicity, gender, homelessness, color, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, marital status, political affiliation or beliefs, membership or activity in or on behalf of a labor organization or against a labor organization, physical or mental disability, age, economic or social status or citizenship of the victim;
- (c) Quarterly and annual reports of the statistics on the incidence of crimes and incidents of domestic disturbances; and
- (d) Special reports as directed by the Governor.

Correlating Oregon statutes that reference ORS 166.165, 166.155, 30.198, 30.200, and 181.550 for categorical, offense provisions, and punishment references should also be amended to reflect proposed changes. For efficiency and to save space they are not included in their entirety but are as follows: ORS 131.602, 90.396, 163.707, 166.715, 137.225, 137.712.

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